It would probably be better to frame your formula in terms of pro tanto reasons; the ceteris paribus clause renders it toothless since no two situations are equal in every respect. But the real challenge is how to keep your formula from bleeding into everything. A pro tanto reason not to cause animal suffering, after all, is basically a reason not to spend money on anything. After all, whoever you give your money to might use that money to buy meat, in which case you'd have done something that caused animal suffering. So there's a pro tanto reason not to buy clothing, not to tip your waiter, and even not to buy vegan food from the local grocery store.
Yeah, that’s one challenge that prevented me from adopting the pro tanto stance as well. Ceteris paribus, strictly construed, has its own problems of course, but it just serves as a guiding light for right action rather than an explicit prescription. The idea being something like: once you see how the logic flows in the ideal scenario, start perturbing it to make it more realistic and see how robust the conclusions are. So it’s a plea to the interlocutor to introspect, and strictly speaking not a direct argument/proof that compels them with argumentative force.
I agree that it comes off as toothless in some sense, but i couldn’t find a satisfactory stronger imperative.
It’s also the “weakest” formulation of animal welfare considerations i could think of—as a mathematician I’m addicted to making my assumptions as weak as possible while still reaching the conclusion.
I think you make a lot of interesting moves here, but I’m still a bit muddled on the details of the proposal.
For two brief points:
1) Ceteris Paribus - it’s a devil of an idea. What actually constitutes equal? You say plant material can mirror taste for example, but is it *really* equal? Or is it equal *enough?* This matters only because, as a vague condition that primarily relies on intuition, it can be argued in both the loose or restrictive senses. It’s also not entirely clear what must be equal in ceteris paribus cases. It certainly won’t be everything about the two options, because they are different things! So, you might say nutrients must be equal, but why can’t I say “cultural value” or something like that must also be equal?
2) The utilitarian move still feels unmotivated to me. I understand that, from the prior article, you take the agent/patients distinction to call for the utilitarianism, but I don’t see why that has to be the case. Insofar as animals are moral patients, any harms done to them are wrong only by virtue of an agent being in the loop. This is contrary to the utilitarian thesis which suggests that the suffering caused is bad in and of itself. I need to see exactly what is wrong about the suffering, in what way, for what reason. Is it wrong because we ought not promote it for some distinctly human reason? Is it wrong simpliciter?
Patiently awaiting to see where you take this next!
1. Indeed, i am sweeping a lot of technical nuances under the rug. I see it as the only remaining possibility because deontology is ruled out (animals don’t have ends that they consciously act towards attaining, or an appreciation of the “higher values”) and reducing animals to the status of rocks or dirt seems to be missing something important.
It’s difficult to determine exactly what would constitute equality, but it’s just a theoretical construct to hold up real world examples to. At some point it just calls for personal honesty—people have to ask themselves, is there really a relevant distinction or am i just rationalising my resistance to changing my behaviour?
2. Maybe utilitarianism is not the precise term, but what i meant to say is that conduct of moral agents like humans with regard to animals should be evaluated on the basis of “the calculus of pleasure and pain”, so to speak. In particular we should try to avoid actions that cause them pain, and for companion animals in particular, ensure that they live a good life.
The fuzziness I’m afraid is something intrinsic to ethics in general. It is an a priori inexact science; the proper approach to ethics really is to LIVE it rather than theorise about it, but sometimes theoretical musing is unavoidable. Especially when considering the implications of a radical break from existing cultural practices such as veganism.
I don’t think a few cents more would cut it. Margins are incredibly small. I would like to live in q world where people ate a mostly whole food plant-based diet with very little meat, dairy, or eggs, so that the animals could be kept in better condition. Even in such a world though, i think there would still be a moral duty to be vegan—consuming meat would be seen as a vice, and not something to be encouraged or celebrated.
The battle is won when the average person regards the dairy farmer or rancher the same way that they regard tobacco executives.
It would probably be better to frame your formula in terms of pro tanto reasons; the ceteris paribus clause renders it toothless since no two situations are equal in every respect. But the real challenge is how to keep your formula from bleeding into everything. A pro tanto reason not to cause animal suffering, after all, is basically a reason not to spend money on anything. After all, whoever you give your money to might use that money to buy meat, in which case you'd have done something that caused animal suffering. So there's a pro tanto reason not to buy clothing, not to tip your waiter, and even not to buy vegan food from the local grocery store.
Yeah, that’s one challenge that prevented me from adopting the pro tanto stance as well. Ceteris paribus, strictly construed, has its own problems of course, but it just serves as a guiding light for right action rather than an explicit prescription. The idea being something like: once you see how the logic flows in the ideal scenario, start perturbing it to make it more realistic and see how robust the conclusions are. So it’s a plea to the interlocutor to introspect, and strictly speaking not a direct argument/proof that compels them with argumentative force.
I agree that it comes off as toothless in some sense, but i couldn’t find a satisfactory stronger imperative.
It’s also the “weakest” formulation of animal welfare considerations i could think of—as a mathematician I’m addicted to making my assumptions as weak as possible while still reaching the conclusion.
I think you make a lot of interesting moves here, but I’m still a bit muddled on the details of the proposal.
For two brief points:
1) Ceteris Paribus - it’s a devil of an idea. What actually constitutes equal? You say plant material can mirror taste for example, but is it *really* equal? Or is it equal *enough?* This matters only because, as a vague condition that primarily relies on intuition, it can be argued in both the loose or restrictive senses. It’s also not entirely clear what must be equal in ceteris paribus cases. It certainly won’t be everything about the two options, because they are different things! So, you might say nutrients must be equal, but why can’t I say “cultural value” or something like that must also be equal?
2) The utilitarian move still feels unmotivated to me. I understand that, from the prior article, you take the agent/patients distinction to call for the utilitarianism, but I don’t see why that has to be the case. Insofar as animals are moral patients, any harms done to them are wrong only by virtue of an agent being in the loop. This is contrary to the utilitarian thesis which suggests that the suffering caused is bad in and of itself. I need to see exactly what is wrong about the suffering, in what way, for what reason. Is it wrong because we ought not promote it for some distinctly human reason? Is it wrong simpliciter?
Patiently awaiting to see where you take this next!
1. Indeed, i am sweeping a lot of technical nuances under the rug. I see it as the only remaining possibility because deontology is ruled out (animals don’t have ends that they consciously act towards attaining, or an appreciation of the “higher values”) and reducing animals to the status of rocks or dirt seems to be missing something important.
It’s difficult to determine exactly what would constitute equality, but it’s just a theoretical construct to hold up real world examples to. At some point it just calls for personal honesty—people have to ask themselves, is there really a relevant distinction or am i just rationalising my resistance to changing my behaviour?
2. Maybe utilitarianism is not the precise term, but what i meant to say is that conduct of moral agents like humans with regard to animals should be evaluated on the basis of “the calculus of pleasure and pain”, so to speak. In particular we should try to avoid actions that cause them pain, and for companion animals in particular, ensure that they live a good life.
The fuzziness I’m afraid is something intrinsic to ethics in general. It is an a priori inexact science; the proper approach to ethics really is to LIVE it rather than theorise about it, but sometimes theoretical musing is unavoidable. Especially when considering the implications of a radical break from existing cultural practices such as veganism.
Here i mean the calculus of pleasure and pain wrt EACH animal, not animals as a whole
Beautiful
I eat meat but I can completely understand your views and values
We all love meat and we love animals
But we can’t handle animal abuse
However eating meat shouldn’t be the problem
The condition the animals are kept in is horrible
I have heard that if you pay a few cents more for meat you would stop animal torture
Brilliant article
I don’t think a few cents more would cut it. Margins are incredibly small. I would like to live in q world where people ate a mostly whole food plant-based diet with very little meat, dairy, or eggs, so that the animals could be kept in better condition. Even in such a world though, i think there would still be a moral duty to be vegan—consuming meat would be seen as a vice, and not something to be encouraged or celebrated.
The battle is won when the average person regards the dairy farmer or rancher the same way that they regard tobacco executives.
Agreed
I would prefer eating meat like once a week or once a month.Trying to reduce the amount of times you eat meat in a year is good
True, less is better than more, but none is better than some!