I'd say it's our existence and mutual recognition as *irrational* beings that implies side constraints on actions. Animals strike us as non-rational, which is why we think they don't count as much. What binds humans together, and avoids the argument from marginal cases, is that we're systematically irrational.
Of course, everyone is systematically irrational in a slightly different way -- and that's what we call a personality. And it's because we don't see, say, cows as having personalities that we think they're interchangeable and thus not proper subjects for deontological side constraints. But as soon as, say, a dog has a distinctive personality, we're much more inclined to put it under the Kantian umbrella.
Do you mean to contrast irrational as opposed to non-rational based on the capacity for reason, or something else? I’m not sure i follow how that avoids the argument from marginal cases though.
Yeah, "irrational" in the sense of having a capacity for reason but systematically ignoring it, and "non-rational" in the sense of not having that capacity at all.
The argument from marginal cases tells us to reject rationality as a criterion of personhood because it would exclude too many humans. Irrationality as a criterion, however, excludes only the non-rational humans, like the permanently comatose, and not those who aren't especially inclined to obey reason's dictates.
That is an interesting perspective, and genuinely novel for me! But on my view, i am not so sure the argument from marginal cases does that — i would accept that the marginal cases don’t have full rights, and argue that they limited rights of a sort. Even in practice, we DON’T apply the usual side-constraints to such cases.
If you forcibly tried to change an adult’s diaper, of course it would be assault. But we (correctly) treat babies differently. I think it’s similar for all the marginal cases. Since they are all human and thus at least have the POTENTIAL to act rationally at times, we may appeal to the precautionary principle to grant them limited rights, while the standard side-constraints apply for the non-controversial “interior” cases.
Yeah, it would be novel for a lot of people :). There's just so much worship of rationality in philosophy, grounded, I think, in the idea that rationality = thinking. But rationality is just one kind of thinking, and not the most interesting kind.
Here's a useful thought experiment. Imagine a perfectly rational being -- a human calculator -- a conduit through which reason operates. Is it even obvious that such a creature should have moral standing?
Fascinating read and awaiting the next part! While I personally lean towards a reducterian approach primarily motivated by sustainability rather than animals rights, I am strongly reminded of Tobias Leenaert's argument in his book "How to Create a Vegan World". He suggests that the only truly compelling reason to go fully vegan is a commitment to animal rights, since other goals like sustainability, climate change, and health can often be achieved through non-vegan diets.
I'd say it's our existence and mutual recognition as *irrational* beings that implies side constraints on actions. Animals strike us as non-rational, which is why we think they don't count as much. What binds humans together, and avoids the argument from marginal cases, is that we're systematically irrational.
Of course, everyone is systematically irrational in a slightly different way -- and that's what we call a personality. And it's because we don't see, say, cows as having personalities that we think they're interchangeable and thus not proper subjects for deontological side constraints. But as soon as, say, a dog has a distinctive personality, we're much more inclined to put it under the Kantian umbrella.
Do you mean to contrast irrational as opposed to non-rational based on the capacity for reason, or something else? I’m not sure i follow how that avoids the argument from marginal cases though.
Yeah, "irrational" in the sense of having a capacity for reason but systematically ignoring it, and "non-rational" in the sense of not having that capacity at all.
The argument from marginal cases tells us to reject rationality as a criterion of personhood because it would exclude too many humans. Irrationality as a criterion, however, excludes only the non-rational humans, like the permanently comatose, and not those who aren't especially inclined to obey reason's dictates.
That is an interesting perspective, and genuinely novel for me! But on my view, i am not so sure the argument from marginal cases does that — i would accept that the marginal cases don’t have full rights, and argue that they limited rights of a sort. Even in practice, we DON’T apply the usual side-constraints to such cases.
If you forcibly tried to change an adult’s diaper, of course it would be assault. But we (correctly) treat babies differently. I think it’s similar for all the marginal cases. Since they are all human and thus at least have the POTENTIAL to act rationally at times, we may appeal to the precautionary principle to grant them limited rights, while the standard side-constraints apply for the non-controversial “interior” cases.
Yeah, it would be novel for a lot of people :). There's just so much worship of rationality in philosophy, grounded, I think, in the idea that rationality = thinking. But rationality is just one kind of thinking, and not the most interesting kind.
Here's a useful thought experiment. Imagine a perfectly rational being -- a human calculator -- a conduit through which reason operates. Is it even obvious that such a creature should have moral standing?
A rational zombie, so to speak? :)
Exactly. Rationality in the absence of humanity.
Fascinating read and awaiting the next part! While I personally lean towards a reducterian approach primarily motivated by sustainability rather than animals rights, I am strongly reminded of Tobias Leenaert's argument in his book "How to Create a Vegan World". He suggests that the only truly compelling reason to go fully vegan is a commitment to animal rights, since other goals like sustainability, climate change, and health can often be achieved through non-vegan diets.
Thanks! I will check out his book.